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1. Introduction 
The history of the unemployment insurance dates back to the middle of the nineteenth 
century when trade unions first began to pay benefits to workers when they were out of 
work. From 1890 to 1905 several cities in continental Europe established voluntary 
unemployment benefit plans. The first plan of this kind was started in 1893 in Berne, 
Switzerland, and was followed by similar plans in other Swiss, German, and Italian 
cities. In 1901 the Belgian city of Ghent established a system of municipal subsidies to 
trade union funds. Known as the „Ghent system," it spread widely from the beginning 
of the twentieth century until the World War II. 
In the early part of the 20th century many provinces or cantons began to add their 
subsidies to those of the cities. Some national governments also made annual grants. At 
the outbreak of the World War II these voluntary systems had a considerable coverage 
and yielded a wide distribution of unemployment benefits in bad years, but in no 
country did they cover even half the industrial wage earners. 
Following the establishment of the voluntary plans, a movement began to develop 
for national unemployment insurance. As early as 1894 an attempt was made to 
establish a compulsory unemployment insurance system in the Swiss canton of St. Gall, 
but it soon failed. The first real achievement was made by Great Britain in 1911 when 
the first national compulsory system in any country was established. No other country 
followed Great Britain until eight years later when Italy established compulsory 
insurance. Germany enacted a compulsory unemployment insurance law in 1927.' (See 
Table 1) 
Prof, of labour law at the University of Szeged, Hungary. 
' TIM LAMBERT: A brief history of unemployment, http://www.localhistories.org/unemployment.html (16.04. 
2011) 
2 6 4 JÓZSEF HAJDÚ 
Table 1. 
Coverage of foreign countries with compulsory unemployment insurance laws 
Country1 Date of law 
Number 
insured2 
Australia (Queensland) Oct. 18,1922 175,000 
Austria3 Mar. 24,1920 1,012,000 
Bulgaria Apr. 12,1925 280,000 
Germany July 15,1927 13,472,000 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland Dec. 16,1911 14,753,000 
Irish Free State Aug. 9,1920 380,000 
Italy Oct. 19,1919 4,500,000 
Poland July 18,1924 957,000 
Switzerland (13 Cantons) Code of Obligations (CO) of • 
30 March 1911 245,000 
Yugoslavia Dec. 15,1935 4 
Total number insured by 
compulsory systems 35,774,000 
'A compulsory law was passed in the U. S. S. R. in 1922, but benefit payments were suspended 
in 1930. 
2 These are the most recent figures available. 
3 Although the Austrian system is in many respects similar to unemployment insurance systems 
of other European countries, it is distinguished from them by requiring a means test of 
applicants for benefits. 
4 Data not yet available. 
Source: http://wwwJarrydewitt.net/SSinGAPE/UI1937book2.htm 
In addition, 10 countries and 12 Cantons o f Switzerland with a coverage o f 
approximately 4 , 1 6 1 , 0 0 0 persons have voluntary systems. ( S e e Table 2 ) 
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Table 2. 
Coverage of foreign countries with voluntary unemployment insurance laws 
Country Date of law 
Number 
insured1 
Belgium Dec. 30,1920 899,000 
Czechoslovakia July 19,1921 1,407,000 
Denmark Apr. 9,1907 375,000 
Finland Nov. 2,1917 15,000 
France Sept. 9,1905 192,000 
Greece 2 46,000 
Netherlands Dec. 2,1916 564,000 
Norway Aug. 6,1915 54,000 
Spain May 25,1931 62,000 
Sweden June 15,1934 240,000 
Switzerland (12 Cantons)3 Oct. 17,1924 307 ,000 
Total number insured by voluntary systems 4,161,000 
' These are the most recent figures available. 
2 There is no information available on the date of the law. Data from „Industrial and Labour 
Information," Nov. 18, 1935, vol. 56, no. 7, indicates that insurance funds were in existence 
in the tobacco, milling, and baking industries and the Athens newspaper staffs. 
3 Nine of these Cantons specify that communes may enforce compulsory insurance 
within their borders. 
Source: http://www.larrydewitt.net/SSinGAPE/UI1937book2Jitm 
Compulsory vs. Voluntary At the very beginning two main types of systems -
compulsory or voluntary - spread largely along the lines of economic ideology. 
English-speaking states adopted the British system, in which compulsory contributions 
were made by all employers and wage earners. Australia, the United States, New 
Zealand and independent Ireland all held more staunchly to free-market liberalism and 
had their own versions of this basic model. Nordic states like Finland, Norway, Sweden, 
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Denmark as "well as states favoring strong labour unions and socialist ideology, like 
Czechoslovakia, Spain and others followed the voluntary (according to labour union 
membership) model.2 
At the turn of the 20th century, unemployment insurance in Britain, Germany, 
Denmark, and Sweden was arranged by trade unions which thereby provided an 
alternative to the existing Poor Laws. The union schemes in the four countries typically 
related benefits to contributions and length of union membership. Like trade unionism, 
coverage was most widespread among industrial workers and craft. 
There was a general growth in the spread of schemes after the turn of the century. 
Government action concerning unemployment started to be considered in all four 
countries from the turn of the century and onwards in the context of considerations of 
more general social security reforms. With increasing government involvement highly 
diverse forms of provision for the unemployed emerged in the four countries. In Britain 
and Germany the basis of unemployment insurance in trade unionism disappeared while 
in Denmark and Sweden trade union schemes were strengthened as a result of policy.3 
In the following section public action towards unemployment insurance is analyzed, 
starting with the Belgian, British case, followed by the German one and ending with the 
Scandinavian case. 
2. The Ghent system 
The „Ghent system" is the name given to an arrangement in some countries whereby the 
main responsibility for welfare payments, especially unemployment benefits, is held by 
trade/labour unions, rather than a government agency. The system is named after the 
city of Ghent, Belgium, where it was first implemented. The Ghent municipal authority 
first opted to subsidize trade union programs with public funds in 1901.4 
Because workers in many cases need to belong to a union to receive benefits, union 
membership is higher in countries with the Ghent system. Furthermore, the state benefit 
is a fixed sum, but the union benefits depend on previous earnings.5 
This system, or those very similar to it, spread through countries in Europe that 
made extensive use of strong labour unions. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway,6 
Sweden, Denmark and others used (and still uses it nowadays) this system. These 
mainly Scandinavian countries have in common the presence of a so-called „Ghent 
system". A Ghent system can be defined as state-subsidised, but voluntary 
unemployment insurance administered by unions. 
When workers are displaced, they are provided benefits via the trade union they 
were a member of it. Because they must be a member of a union in order to receive 
2 http://www.ehow.com/about_6392851_history-employment-insurance.html (21.03.2011) 
3 European Economic Review 39. 1995, pp. 565-574. 
4 http://www.jrank.org/business/pages/655/Ghent-system.html (16 April, 2011) 
5 PETRI BOCKERMAN and ROOPE UUSITALO, (2006), „ Erosion of the Ghent System and Union Membership 
Decline: Lessons from Finland" Brush Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 283-303. 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.cOm/journal/l 18725626/abstract (16. April, 2011) 
6 N.B.: Norway abolished the Ghent System in 1938. 
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benefits, this had the effect of bolstering union membership. Though trade unions in 
Sweden were among the first to provide benefits in this manner (in the 1870's), 
governments were generally not involved until Ghent.7 
In all of the above countries, unemployment funds held by unions or labour 
federations are regulated and/or partly subsidised by the national government 
concerned.8 
According to Mancur Olson's well-known theoretical framework, a Ghent system 
may act as a valuable „selective incentive" for union membership because it reduces 
free-rider9 tendencies.10 While the historical partisanship of government and the 
combination of centralised collective bargaining and direct union access to the 
workplace may count as well, there is overwhelming empirical evidence that a Ghent 
system contributes to a high union membership rate and largely explains the persistent 
cross-national divergence of union density." Especially when unemployment in most 
post-industrialised countries increased to double digits during the last quarter of the 
20th century, the positive effect of the Ghent system upon unionisation became 
clear.12,13 
Nowadays, union-managed unemployment insurance (UI) schemes are under 
pressure in Denmark, Finland and Sweden.14 These countries have recently seen the 
emergence of independent unemployment funds that provide UI without requiring union 
membership. In Sweden, the legitimacy of the traditional Ghent system is further 
undermined by the hollowing-out of unemployment benefits and the introduction of 
additional forms of insurance.15 This gradual weakening of the close relationship 
between UI and the unions largely explains the fall in union membership, particularly 
among young employees. Although union density is still very high, the Danish, Finnish 
and Swedish unions must be wary of a further erosion of the Ghent system. Belgium 
7 JENS LIND (2007) „A Nordic Saga? The Ghent System and Trade Unions" International Journal of 
Employment Studies (http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/lGl-171535932.html) International Journal of 
Employment Studies (16 April, 2011) 
8 SCRUGGS, LYLE, (2001), „The Ghent System and Union Membership in Europe, 1970-1996" Political 
Research Quarterly Vol. 55, No. 2 (http://www.vm.uconn.edu/scruggs/prq.pdf) University of Connecticut 
Website (16 April, 2011) 
9 Person who enjoys a benefit (here unemployment benefit) accruing from a collective effort (trade union 
membership), but contributes little or nothing to the effort. 
10 HOLMLUND, BERTIL and PER LUNDBORG, (1999), Wage bargaining, union membership, and the 
organization of unemployment insurance, Labour Economics, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 397—415. 
" CHECCHI, DANIELE and JELLE VISSER, (2005), Pattern Persistence in European Trade Union Density A 
longitudinal analysis 1950-1996. European Sociological Review, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 1—21. 
12 http://www.newunionism.net/library/organizing/Transfer%20-%20Special%20Focus%20on%20the%20Ghent%20 
System%20-%202006.pdf (16 April, 2011) 
13 SCRUGGS, LYLE and PETER LANGE, ( 2 0 0 1 ) , Unemployment and Union Density, in: N a n c y B e r m e o ( e d . ) 
Unemployment in the New Europe, Cambridge University Press, pp 145-171. 
14 JOKIVUOR1, PERTTI, (2006), Trade union density and unemployment insurance in Finland. Transfer: 
European Review of Labour and Research Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 83-87. 
15 KJELLBERG, ANDERS, (2006). The Swedish unemployment insurance - will the Ghent system survive? 
Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, Vol. 1, No. 6, pp. 87-98. 
2 6 8 JÓZSEF HAJDÚ 
may be an interesting case for them because the Belgian UI system, as a compulsory 
scheme, continues to provide an incentive for union membership.16 
2.1. The development of the Ghent system 
In response to unemployment, which was a basically new phenomenon in the 19th 
century, typographers' unions were the first in Belgium to establish unemployment 
funds. Other unions set up funds to insure their members against unemployment in 
return for a regular contribution. However, largely because of their limited financial 
strength, most funds ran into difficulty. In Ghent, a city with a long tradition of worker 
organisations, in 1895 the unions turned to the city council with requests for additional 
financial support. The council appointed Louis Variez, a liberal lawyer and social 
researcher, to study the unemployment problem. Having studied experimental voluntary 
UI schemes at home and abroad Variez conceived a scheme based on the ethos of „self-
help" and individual responsibility. The resulting communal unemployment fund came 
into force on 1 August 1901. 
The purpose of the communal unemployment fund was not to encourage 
unionisation, but only to ease the consequences of unemployment. The supplement that 
the fund provided to the unemployed was unconditional on union membership and 
oriented to the individual insured worker. Non-union members could register with the 
city council and, in case of unemployment, receive the same supplement as that paid out 
to union members. Moreover, the role of the unions was incidental and instrumental. If 
the unemployed worker was insured at a union unemployment fund, the municipal 
supplement was granted through the local union.17 However, since the supplement was 
given irrespective of the union's ideology, the principle of „self-help" stimulated the 
unions to lobby the city council to increase the supplement for everyone.18 At the same 
time, the authorities helped the unions as private organisations to carry out their own 
activities through subsidies. As a result, the principle of liberté subsidée - subsidised 
liberty - encouraged unions to establish unemployment funds affiliated to a municipal 
unemployment fund and stimulated workers to join unions and to remain union 
members when they were unemployed. 
Hence, very few workers were members of the non-union-affiliated unemployment 
funds. Other cities soon followed the practice in Ghent, but the quantitative impact 
remained quite limited before World War I. As „an expression of the national life in 
which it functions",19 the Ghent system was a clear Belgian example of a synthesis 
16 http://www.newunionism.net/library/organizing/Transfer%20-%20Special%20Focus%20on%20the%20Ghent%20 
System%20-%202006.pdf (16 April, 2011) 
17 As an alternative form of public intervention on unemployment, the so-called „Liège system" directly 
supplied grants to the union unemployment funds in 1897. The provincial government had the explicit 
purpose of stimulating the unions involved in UI. This socialist initiative was unsuccessful because 
Catholics and liberals favoured the Ghent system whose basic principles were more in line with their 
respective ideologies. 
18 STRIKWERDA, CARL, (1997), A house divided. Catholics, socialists, and Flemish nationalists in nineteenth-
century Belgium, Lanham: Rowman and Little-field. 
19 KIEHEL, CONSTANCE AMELIA ( 1 9 3 2 ) , Unemployment insurance in Belgium. National development of the 
Ghent and Liège systems, New York: Industrial Relations Counsellors: 3. 
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between Catholic paternalism's emphasis on coping for oneself, the individual liberty of 
traditional liberalism and socialist pragmatism. Probably because of its compromise 
character, the Ghent system, adapted in one way or another, became a model for much 
of Europe and it may therefore be considered as the real originator of UI.20 
France was the first country to establish a Ghent system at national level in 1905. 
Norway and Denmark adopted a national voluntary unemployment scheme in the next 
two years. Over the next three decades, similar union-led unemployment schemes were 
in use in the Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland and Sweden. In Belgium, the Ghent 
system was institutionalised at national level and extended in 192021 A new 
government institution, the Nationaal Crisisfonds/ National Crisis Fund, was created to 
manage the state's new benefit system. The UI remained a voluntary system largely 
based upon the autonomous union unemployment funds. Non-unionlinked funds 
remained inferior. Moreover, the unions were able to make their services for the 
unemployed more attractive. 
Apart from central government support and union benefits, various benefits for the 
unemployed remained mostly intact at the municipal and provincial level, especially 
where socialist or Christian Democratic political parties were in the majority. Because 
the unions paid out all benefits, most unemployed union members were probably 
unaware of the real source of the payments, which, among other factors, contributed to 
the further rise in union membership in the interwar years. 
2.2. The Ghent system under pressure in the interwar years 
To break the union monopoly in UI, employers set up their own unemployment 
funds, but they had little success. Employers' or public sector unemployment funds 
insured about 3% of workers in 193022 In fact, conservatives and the main employers' 
federation preferred a compulsory UI system. But such a system stood little chance 
immediately after World War I because of union opposition. Employers' displeasure 
with the Ghent system re-emerged when the unemployment question was brought to the 
surface by the economic crisis in the 1930s23 They basically criticised the fact that, 
2 0 EBBINGHAUS, BERNHARD and VISSER, JELLE ( 1 9 9 9 ) When institutions matter: Union growth and decline in 
Western Europe, 1950-1995. European Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 135-158; Strikwerda, 
Carl, (1997), A house divided. Catholics, socialists, and Flemish nationalists in nineteenth-century 
Belgium, LANHAM: Rowman and Little-field: pp. 51-55.; ALBER, J. (1981), Government responses to the 
challenge of unemployment: the development of unemployment insurance in Western Europe, in: P. Flora 
and A. J. Heidenheimer (eds.), The development of welfare states in Europe and America, London: 
Transaction books; ILO (1955), Unemployment insurance schemes, International Labour Office Geneva: 
ILO: 15 . 
21 VANTHEMSCHE, GUY (1990), Unemployment insurance in interwar Belgium, International Review of 
Social History, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 349-376. 
22 KLEHEL, CONSTANCE AMELIA ( 1 9 3 2 ) Unemployment insurance in Belgium. N a t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t o f the 
Ghent and Liège systems, New York: Industrial Relations Counsellors: p. 148. 
2 3 GOOSSENS, MARTINE, STEFAAN PEETERS , and GUIDO PEPERMANS ( 1 9 8 8 ) , Interwar unemployment in 
Belgium, in: Eichengreen, Barry and Timothy J. Hatton (eds.), Interwar unemployment in an international 
perspective, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 289-324. 
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through their hold on the UI system, the unions had control over the labour market.24 
During the first half of the 1930s, supported by the employers, conservative Catholic-
liberal coalition governments launched an array of initiatives intended to restrict the 
Ghent system, but the almost exclusive role of the unions remained unaffected. 
However, economic depression caused severe organisational and financial problems 
for the unions, with some of them even on the verge of bankruptcy in 1932 and 1933.25 
Owing to these problems, compulsory insurance against unemployment was (again) 
placed in the foreground by some unions, particularly by the national leadership of the 
socialist trade union federation.26 The labour movement was deeply divided, however. 
The majority opposed an extension of „state intervention" in the UI scheme, especially 
the Christian trade union confederation, the Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond/ General 
Confederation of Christian Trade Unions which took a firm stand on retaining union 
participation in the administration. Only the national leadership of the socialist union 
confederation favoured abolition of the union-mn unemployment funds and replacing 
them with a state-administered system.27 Most of their affiliated unions, especially those 
in Flanders, were opposed because they feared a drop in membership. So, different 
socialist union congresses voted against the ending of the union-administered 
unemployment scheme but differences of opinion continued to exist. In 1936 the 
Catholic-liberal-socialist government appointed a royal commissioner for 
unemployment to write a report that would be used as the basis for a debate in 
parliament on the introduction of a compulsory UI system28 In his final report the 
commissioner made a plea for the abolition of all autonomous unemployment funds and 
their replacement with a government agency jointly managed by workers' and 
employers' representatives. Furthermore, UI would be financed by mandatory 
contributions from both workers and employers. Their contributions would be paid in 
advance and deposited in a central public fund. 
The psychological and financial link between workers and trade unions would be 
diminished through this collection system. Still, the unions would retain their 
involvement in benefit administration by paying out unemployment benefits.29 City 
councils or regional offices of the government agency would also be able to disburse the 
24 According to the employers, unemployment benefit was too high, and, as a result, a wage-deflationary 
policy was obstructed. 
25 VANTHEMSCHE, GUY (1990), Unemployment insurance in interwar Belgium, International Review of 
Social History Vol. 35 No. 3 p. 368. 
26 Immediately after World War I the unions had in mind the replacement of voluntary UI by a compulsory 
system, but with preservation of the pivotal role of the union-run unemployment funds. 
27 Apart from a Weberian rational bureaucratic viewpoint, the socialist union leadership wanted to encourage 
the class struggle that was being neglected, in their view, due to union involvement in the UI system. Albeit 
for very different reasons, they therefore stood alongside the employers, who also wanted to abolish the 
Ghent system. 
28 VANTHEMSCHE, GUY (1990), Unemployment insurance in interwar Belgium, International Review of 
Social History Vol. 35 No. 3 pp. 368-371. 
29 The royal commissioner for unemployment argued that the beneficiary must not be treated uncaringly, 
which would probably be the case at the office window of a public service. 
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benefit. However, no parliamentary compromise could be reached on the report and UI 
reform was still in an impasse when World War II broke out.30 
2.3. The influence on the US industrial relations 
The Ghent system is a voluntary system of unemployment insurance in which labour 
unions administer publicly subsidized insurance funds and, along with employers and 
the state, participate in unemployment insurance policymaking. The Ghent system helps 
overcome three separate problems in collective employment relations that existing 
labour law in the United States attempts to resolve in evidently ineffective ways, which 
the EFCA (Employment Free Choice Act) had sought to reform. First, the Ghent system 
encourages employers to recognize and bargain with unions by providing workers with 
incentives to join labour unions prior to and independent of the employers' recognition 
of the union. Second, voluntary, union-administered unemployment insurance provides 
an alternative "selective incentive" that reduces free riding on collective union goods. 
Finally, union and employer collaboration in unemployment insurance policy generates 
efficiency gains that underwrite cooperative labour relations and reduce employer 
resistance and workplace adversarialism. In exchange for generous unemployment 
benefits, unions yield on employment-protection rules, giving employers more 
flexibility in the workplace—a bargain referred to as "flexicurity."31 
Summary 
According to Mancur Olson's well-known theoretical framework, a Ghent system may 
act as a valuable 'selective incentive' for union membership because it reduces free-
rider tendencies.32. While the historical partisanship of government and the combination 
of centralised collective bargainingand direct union access to the workplace may count 
as well, there is overwhelming empirical evidence that a Ghent system contributes to a 
high union membership rate and largely explains the persistent cross-national 
divergence of union density33. Especially when unemployment in most post-
industrialised countries increased to double-digits during the last quarter of the 
20thcentury, the positive effect of the Ghent system upon unionisation became clear.34 
Nowadays, union-managed unemployment insurance (UI) schemes are under pressure 
30 http://www.newunionism.net/library/organizing/Transfer%20-%20Special%20Focus%20on%20the%20 Ghent% 
20System%20-%202006.pdf 
31 MATTHEW DIMICK (2012), Labour Law, New Governance, and the Ghent System, N.C. L. Rev. 319 
http://www.nclawreview.org/2012/01/labour-law-new-governance-and-the-ghent-system/ 
32 HOLMLUND, B. and P. LUNDBORG (1999), Wage bargaining, union membership, and the organization of 
unemploymentinsurance, Labour Economics ,Vol. 6 No. 3, pp. 397-415. 
33 CHECCHI, DANIELE and JELLE, VlSSER (2005), Pattern persistence in European trade union density. A 
longitudinal analysis 1950-1996, European Sociological Review, Vol. 21 No. 1 pp. 1-21. VlSSER, JELLE 
(2002) Why fewer workers join unions in Europe: a social custom explanation of membership trend, British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 40 No. 3, pp. 403^130. 
34 SCRUGGS, LYLE (2002) The Ghent system and union membership in Europe, 1970-1996, Political Research 
Quarterly, Vol. 55 No. 2, pp. 275-297. 
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in Denmark,35 Finland36 and Sweden. These countries have recently seen the emergence 
of independent unemployment funds that provide UI without requiring union 
membership. In Sweden, the legitimacy of the traditional Ghent system is further 
undermined by the hollowing-out of unemployment benefits and the introduction of 
additional forms of insurance.37 This gradual weakening of the close relationship 
between UI and the unions largely explains the fall in union membership, particularly 
among young employees. Although union density is still very high, the Danish, Finnish 
and Swedish unions must be wary of a further erosion of the Ghent system. 
35 LIND, JENS (2004), The restructuring of the Ghent model in Denmark and consequences for the trade 
unions, Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, Vol. 10 No. 4, pp. 621-625. 
36 JOKIVUORI, PRETTI (2006), Trade union density and unemployment insurance in Finland, Transfer: 
European Review of Labour and Research, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 83-87. BÖCKERMAN, PETRI and ROOPE, 
UUSITALO (2006), Erosion of the Ghent System and Union Membership Decline: Lessons from Finland, 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 44 No. 2, pp. 283-303. 
37 KJELLBERG, ANDERS (2006),. The Swedish unemployment insurance - will the Ghent system survive? 
Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, Vol. 1, No. 6, pp. 87-98. 
